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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)
Plaintiff-Respondent,
)
)
v.
)
)
JEFFREY SCOTT NALLY,
)
)
Defendant-Appellant.
)
___________________________)

NO. 43208
KOOTENAI COUNTY NO. CR 2015-2289
APPELLANT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
All the decisions regarding Jeffery Nally’s two days at the rider program were
made too quickly. The rider staff rushed in sending him back with a recommendation
for relinquishment before the internal review of the disciplinary reports (hereinafter,
DORs) alleged against him was completed. Their notes about the alleged incidents are,
as trial counsel pointed out, inaccurate or incomplete.

They do not mention, for

example, that several other inmates in the program backed Mr. Nally’s version of events
as to one of the alleged incidents, one even asserting the reports had been fabricated
by the reporting inmates, and the reporting inmates had tried to get others to join in the
lie. The district court rushed, holding a hearing and relinquishing jurisdiction based in
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part on those allegations, which appear to have ultimately been dismissed on review by
the deputy warden.

As a result of all the rushed decisions, Mr. Nally appeals,

contending the district court abused its discretion when it refused to continue retaining
jurisdiction in this case and let him actually participate in the rider program.
Statement of the Facts & Course of Proceedings
Mr. Nally has been cooperative with authorities in this case from the outset. He
was cooperative with the officers investigating a break-in at a K-Mart. (Tr., Vol.1, p.7,
Ls.15-16.)1 He waived a preliminary hearing and pled guilty to the resulting charge of
burglary at his initial arraignment hearing in the district court. (See generally Tr., Vol.1;
R., pp.49, 51-52.) In recognition of his cooperation, the prosecutor agreed to not seek a
habitual offender enhancement and agreed to a plea agreement which would bind the
district court to retain jurisdiction in this case. (Tr., Vol.1, p.7, Ls.15-16; Tr., Vol.1, p.8,
Ls.23-25.)

There was no agreement as to the potential underlying sentence, and

Mr. Nally also agreed to waive his right to appeal the conviction (though not the
underlying sentence).

(R., pp.53-54.)

Furthermore, Mr. Nally agreed to waive the

presentence investigation and proceed to sentencing immediately.

(Tr., Vol.1, p.4,

Ls.16-20.)
Before accepting the plea agreement, the district court asked for some
background on Mr. Nally’s record. (Tr., Vol.1, p.5, Ls.3-4.) The prosecutor noted that it

The transcripts in this case are provided in three independently bound and paginated
volumes. To avoid confusion, “Vol.1” will refer to the volume containing the transcript of
the arraignment hearing held on March 27, 2015. “Vol.2” will refer to the volume
containing the transcript of the Jurisdictional Review hearing held on June 12, 2015.
“Vol.3” will refer to the volume containing the transcript of the hearing on Mr. Nally’s
I.C.R. 35 (hereinafter, Rule 35) motion for reconsideration held on October 2, 2015.
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was significant, but also recognized that Mr. Nally’s last felony was ten years behind
him. (Tr., Vol.1, p.8, Ls.11-22.) Mr. Nally added that he was 50 years old and had not
been afforded the opportunity to participate in a program like the rider program before.
(Tr., Vol.1, p.12, Ls.1-9.)

Trial counsel emphasized Mr. Nally’s amenability to

participate in such a program despite having a long record. (Tr., Vol.1, p.10, Ls.10-19.)
The district court ultimately accepted the binding plea agreement, imposed a
unified sentence of ten years, with five years fixed, and retained jurisdiction. (Tr., Vol.1,
p.14, Ls.13-14; R., pp.55-57.)

Mr. Nally filed a notice of appeal timely from the

judgment of conviction so as to challenge the length of the underlying sentence
imposed. (R., pp.58-60.)
In the meantime, Mr. Nally was sent to the rider program. After only two days at
that facility, he was sent back with a recommendation that the district court relinquish
jurisdiction in his case. (Addendum to Presentence Investigation Report (hereinafter,
APSI), p.1.)

The explanation of what happened at the rider program is conflicted,

though there are three events which the staff identified in their report. Nevertheless, the
box for whether Mr. Nally was considered to be a disciplinary concern was checked
“No,” and the report states: “Mr. Nally did not receive[] any formal disciplinary sanctions
while at CAPP,” and “Mr. Nally has not received any informal disciplinary sanctions
while at CAPP.” (APSI, pp.2-3.)
The first incident the rider staff reported was that Mr. Nally created a hostile
atmosphere by referring to other inmates with racial slurs and making obscene gestures
during group orientation. (APSI, p.4.) They based that allegation on reports made by
four inmates. (APSI, p.3.) However, there are no C-Notes about the alleged incident,
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which supposedly occurred during one of the group orientation sessions, nor are there
C-Notes about what investigation was undertaken to verify the reports. (See generally
APSI; see also Tr., Vol.3, p.18, Ls.22-23 (defense counsel challenging that the APSI,
particularly the C-Notes, were “not accurate. They’re certainly not complete.”).)
In fact, four other inmates, who asserted they were in that group session and
were sitting near Mr. Nally, wrote letters to the rider staff averring that the allegations
were untrue. (See generally Augmentation 2.)2 Rather, the distractions were being
caused by two of the inmates who reported the incident, as they were, for example,
making comments about their assumptions regarding Mr. Nally’s racial views based on
his tattoos.3 (Augmentation 2, pp.2-4.) Furthermore, one of those letters reported that
the two inmates were trying to coerce other inmates to lie for them and tell the staff that
Mr. Nally had used racial slurs against them. (Augmentation 2, p.4.) Mr. Nally himself
told the staff that he had encountered two inmates “in my box” a few nights previous
and they had set him up for relinquishment in retaliation. (APSI, p.3.) A fifth inmate
wrote a letter asserting that such retaliatory efforts by inmates are not uncommon.
(Augmentation 2, pp.5-6.) However, the APSI indicated that, when the staff interviewed
Mr. Nally about this event, he admitted to some, but not all, of the allegations. (APSI,

A motion to augment the record with documents related to Mr. Nally’s Rule 35 motion
was granted on November 12, 2015. Citations to those documents will be identified as
“Augmentation 1.” A second motion to augment, which seeks to augment the record
with copies of the letters sent by the other inmates in the rider program, which the
district court reviewed at the jurisdictional review hearing (Tr., Vol.2, p.6, Ls.1-20), has
been filed contemporaneously with this brief. Citations to those letters will be identified
as “Augmentation 2.”
3 Mr. Nally noted those tattoos were thirty years old, and he has since come to regret
getting them. (Tr., Vol.2, p.14, Ls.7-9.)
2
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p.3.) The staff report indicates a DOR was filed for harassment. (APSI, p.4; but see
APSI, p.2.)
The second incident the rider staff noted was that Mr. Nally had vandalized his
cell while awaiting transfer out of the rider facility by removing two screws holding the
cover of the fire alarm in place, putting holes in the wall, and obstructing the ceiling vent.
(APSI, pp.3-4.) Again, there are no C-Notes documenting the incident or any follow up
investigation done by the staff. (See generally APSI.) Mr. Nally asserted that he did not
take the screws out of the fire alarm and pointed out he could not have done so without
tools. (Tr., Vol.2, p.12, Ls.7-11.) The staff report indicates a second DOR was filed for
the damage to the cell. (APSI, p.4; but see APSI, p.2.)
At the jurisdictional review hearing, Mr. Nally informed the district court that he
had appealed both DORs to the deputy warden.

(Tr., Vol.2, p.12, Ls.13-15.)

Furthermore, he asserted that the deputy warden had overturned the DORs and he was
confident the reports would ultimately be dismissed. (Tr., Vol.2, pp.13-19.) He followed
up on this issue at the ensuing Rule 35 motion hearing, testifying that the reports had, in
fact, been dismissed. (Tr., Vol.3, p.14, Ls.18-22.) He also explained neither he nor his
attorney had been able to get any records from the Department of Correction
referencing the incident or its resolution. (Tr., Vol.3, p.14, L.23 - p.15, L.7.) The district
court found Mr. Nally’s credibility to be “lacking to a certain extent,” but it did not
articulate to what extent or to what issues he was not credible. (Tr., Vol.3, p.24, Ls.1-2;
compare Tr., Vol.3, p.24, Ls.6-8 (the district court stating that it believed Mr. Nally’s
testimony about his medical conditions, discussed infra).)
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The third incident the rider staff reported was that Mr. Nally was trying to
manipulate the staff by requesting a wheelchair when he did not need one. (APSI,
pp.6-8.) This was based on the fact that they saw him doing exercises and not properly
using a walker provided to him. (APSI, p.7.) The staff also reported that Mr. Nally had
threatened to fake incidents which would require them to call a medical code if he did
not get a wheelchair. (APSI, pp.7-8) Mr. Nally testified at the Rule 35 motion hearing
that, due to prior back surgeries, he suffers pain if he sits too long without
accommodation. (Tr., Vol.3, p.9, Ls.13-21; Tr., Vol.3, p.15, Ls.21-22.) However, that is
the only time problems arise. For example, he testified the walker was unnecessary
because he has no problems walking without assistance. (Tr., Vol.3, p.16, Ls.1-5.)
Additionally, he testified he can do exercises, and has, in fact, been encouraged to do
so by his doctor. (Tr., Vol.3, p.15, Ls.21-25.)
He also testified that he was originally authorized to have a wheelchair, but the
staff mistakenly took it away without checking with the nurse who authorized it.
(Tr., Vol.3, p.10, L.8 - p.11, L.4; compare APSI, pp.6-7 (the staff recognizing that he had
been authorized to use a wheelchair, but asserting that the authorization had been a
mistake).) He also denied threating to make a scene. (Tr., Vol.3, p.22, Ls.12-16.) Trial
counsel indicated she had received information that, if the district court continued to
retain jurisdiction over Mr. Nally, accommodations could be made to avoid this problem
going forward. (Tr., Vol.2, p.9 Ls.18-22.) The district court stated it believed Mr. Nally’s
representations about this medical issues.

(Tr., Vol.3, p.24, Ls.6-8.)

However, it

expressed concern about the reports of his threats to fake incidents of trouble, though it
recognized Mr. Nally was disputing those reports. (Tr., Vol.3, p.22, Ls.8-20.)
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Ultimately, only three months into its period of retained jurisdiction, the district
court decided to relinquish jurisdiction over Mr. Nally. (R., pp.122-24.) However, it
reduced Mr. Nally’s sentence sua sponte to a unified term of eight years, with three
years fixed. (Tr., Vol.2, p.15, Ls.17-21.) Thereafter, Mr. Nally stipulated to the State’s
request for restitution despite defense counsel’s initial intention to set that matter for an
evidentiary hearing. (Tr., Vol.2, p.16, L.9 - p.17, L.13.)
Mr. Nally filed a timely Rule 35 motion asking the district court to reconsider its
decision to relinquish jurisdiction. (R., p.128.) Accordingly, he requested the district
court continue to retain jurisdiction or, alternatively, reduce his sentence to a unified
term of five years, with two years fixed. (Tr., Vol.3, p.19, L.17 - p.20, L.1.) The district
court denied that motion, based primarily on the reports that Mr. Nally had used racial
slurs and made inappropriate gestures to other inmates and threatened to fake a
medical incident. (Tr., Vol.3, p.22, L21 - p.24, L.17; Augmentation 1 – Order Denying
Defendant’s Rule 35 Motion.)
ISSUE
Whether the district court abused its discretion by refusing to continue retaining
jurisdiction in this case.
ARGUMENT
The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Refusing To Continue Retaining Jurisdiction
In This Case
Rushing to decisions about a defendant’s sentence, including decisions about
whether or not to retain jurisdiction, results in a sentencing determination based on
incomplete or inaccurate information, and so, fails to adequately consider the
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defendant’s character or the nature of the allegations against him.

Compare

State v. Miller, 151 Idaho 828, 835 (2011) (reiterating that, in order to reach a
reasonable sentencing decision, the district court needs to weigh the objectives of
sentencing in light of the defendant’s character). Mr. Nally’s case is a prime example of
these problems.
The rider staff rushed their decision to kick him out of the program, and the
district court rushed its decision to relinquish jurisdiction. It might even be fair to say
Mr. Nally rushed by waiving the PSI process, as the absence of a PSI caused confusion
about his medical needs at the rider facility: In response to Mr. Nally’s request for
accommodation for his back issue, a rider staff member noted there was “[n]o PSI, not
sure what we have. . . . nothing can be found from other facilities (jails). . . . he was
given a wheelchair over the weekend 3 days (mistake).” (APSI, p.7.)
The result of all this rushing was a decision to relinquish jurisdiction over
Mr. Nally and execute his sentence based on incomplete and inaccurate information
about allegations which, according to the only evidence offered on the subject, were
dismissed as part of the Department of Correction’s own review process.

(See

Tr., Vol.3, p.14, Ls.18-22.) Obviously, a decision to relinquish jurisdiction when the
defendant has not engaged in any problematic behavior during the rider program would
be an abuse of discretion. See I.C. 19-2601(4); compare, e.g., I.C.R. 33(f) (providing
that a probationer’s release cannot be revoked absent a willful violation of the terms of
that release).
Getting into the details of the district court’s problematic decision in this case, a
closer review of the information in the record reveals that the district court’s conclusions
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of fact were clearly erroneous. See, e.g., State v. Henage, 143 Idaho 655, 659 (2007)
(reiterating that such conclusions are clearly erroneous if they are not supported by
“substantial and competent evidence”).

The district court stated its decision to

relinquish jurisdiction was based on the reports about Mr. Nally’s alleged misconduct
contained in the APSI, which means it was adopting the APSI’s assertions of fact.
(Tr., Vol.3, p.22, L.3 - p.23, L.9) However, the APSI does not constitute competent and
substantial evidence for several reasons.
The first problem with the APSI is that it is internally inconsistent. It declares that
“Mr. Nally did not receive[] any formal disciplinary sanctions while at CAPP,” and
“Mr. Nally has not received any informal disciplinary sanctions while at CAPP.” (APSI,
pp.2-3.) In fact, in the section asking the reporting staff member to identify whether
Mr. Nally was a disciplinary problem, the reporting staff member checked the “No” box.
(APSI, p.2.) And yet, the report asserts that two DORs were filed against Mr. Nally.
(APSI, pp.3-4.) Either he was a disciplinary issue or he was not. Since the APSI states
he was both, it is, at best, unreliable.
The second problem with the APSI is that the evidence presented to the district
court reveals its reports are not accurate. Most notable is the evidence in the letters
from the four inmates in the group orientation.

Those inmates appear to have no

interest at stake in the dispute between Mr. Nally and his accusers. (See generally
Augmentation 2, pp.1-4.) And yet, they came forward to reveal that Mr. Nally had not
engaged in the conduct for which he was accused.4 (Augmentation 2, pp.1-4.) In fact,

While the district court did note that the APSI indicates Mr. Nally admitted to some of
the alleged conduct, (Tr., Vol.3, p.23, Ls.5-6), it also recognized that he was disputing
the report. (Tr., Vol.3, p.22, L.16; see also Tr., Vol.2, p.12, Ls.13-15 (Mr. Nally asserting

4
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the uncontroverted evidence from their letters reveals that the reports upon which the
APSI, and subsequently, the district court relied, were fabricated by two of the reporting
parties. (Augmentation 2, p.4.) Furthermore, the only evidence on the subject in the
record reveals those reports against Mr. Nally were ultimately dismissed on review by
the deputy warden.5 (See Tr., Vol.2, pp.13-19; Tr., Vol.3, p.14, L.21-25.) The fact that
the APSI states Mr. Nally did not receive any DORs further supports his testimony in
that regard – he did not actually receive any DORs because the reports had been
dismissed upon further review. As such, the allegations in the APSI are unreliable when
all the evidence in the record is given due consideration.
As such, the comments in the APSI do not constitute competent evidence.
(See Tr., Vol.3, p.18, Ls.22-23 (defense counsel challenging that the C-Notes are
inaccurate and incomplete).) Additionally, given all the evidence in the record which
contradicts it, the APSI’s incomplete and inaccurate information is not substantial
evidence either. Thus, the district court’s reliance on the information in the APSI to
justify its decision to not continue retaining jurisdiction over Mr. Nally is clearly
erroneous, and so, constitutes an abuse of its discretion.
Furthermore, a consideration of Mr. Nally’s entire character also reveals the
district court’s conclusions in this regard to be unsupported. Throughout the entire
case, Mr. Nally was cooperative with authorities. He was cooperative with the police,

he had challenged the to the deputy warden).) Besides, the fact that the APSI’s
account of the whole incident is unreliable also means its account of what Mr. Nally may
or may not have admitted is also unreliable, particularly in light of the evidence
suggesting the allegations were dismissed upon further review.
5 It is worth noting that the prosecutor did not challenge Mr. Nally’s testimony in that
regard at either the Jurisdictional Review or Rule 35 hearing. (See generally Tr., Vol.2;
Tr., Vol.3.)
10

confessing his guilt in their initial interview with him. (Tr., Vol.1, p.7, Ls.15-16.) He was
cooperative with the prosecutor, agreeing to plead guilty at his initial arraignment
hearing. (See generally Tr., Vol.1; R., pp.51-52.) He was cooperative with the initial
sentencing judge in discussing his criminal history to support his plea agreement and
waiver of the PSI.

(See, e.g., Tr., Vol.1, p.5, Ls.3-4; Tr., Vol.1, p.10, Ls.10-19;

Tr., Vol.1, p.12, Ls.1-9.) He was cooperative with the relinquishing judge, stipulating to
the restitution request despite counsel’s initial intentions to request an evidentiary
hearing. (Tr., Vol.2, p.16, L.9 - p.17, L.13.) And yet, according to the rider staff’s report,
this otherwise-cooperative person, who accepted responsibility for his actions from the
outset, was immediately causing problems in the one program in which he had
requested the opportunity to participate.

An accurate consideration of Mr. Nally’s

character reveals that the district court’s decision to not continue retaining jurisdiction in
this case was not reasonable.
Additionally, the fact that the rush to judgment deprived Mr. Nally of the primary
benefit for which he bargained in the plea agreement is concerning. Pursuant to the
plea agreement, Mr. Nally would plead guilty as charged (which did not include a
sentencing enhancement), he would waive his right to appeal the conviction (though not
the sentence), and there was no limitation on what the underlying sentence would be.
(See R., pp.53-54.) And yet, as a result of the rushed decisions in this case, he was not
afforded a meaningful opportunity to even start the program, as he was sent back after
only two days at the program’s facility. The staff did not even have time to assign him to
a program pathway.

(APSI, p.2.)

And yet, based on inaccurate and incomplete

information, he was deprived of that opportunity.
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Because the district court reached a rushed, unreasonable conclusion about
whether to continue retaining jurisdiction in this case, such that Mr. Nally might actually
be given the opportunity to participate in the rider program, in light of a complete
understanding of Mr. Nally’s character and the evidence actually presented in the
record, this Court should remedy that unreasonable decision.
CONCLUSION
Mr. Nally respectfully requests that this Court remand this case to the district
court with instruction it retain jurisdiction so he can participate in the rider program.
Alternatively, he requests this Court reduce his sentence as it deems appropriate or
remand the case for such a decision from the district court.
DATED this 14th day of March, 2016.

_________/s/________________
BRIAN R. DICKSON
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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